КУАЙН ЗА ДИСПОЗИЦИОННИТЕ ОБЯСНЕНИЯ КАТО БЕЛЕГ ЗА НЕЗРЯЛА НАУКА И ЕДНА АЛТЕРНАТИВНА ГЛЕДНА ТОЧКА
In: Philosophical Alternatives Journal / Filosofski Alternativi, 2018-12-01, Heft 6, S. 20-29
Online
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Zugriff:
Dispositions play a key role in Quine’s philosophy of language as well as in his explanations of behavior. At the same time, Quine argues that the use of dispositional explanations is a mark of immaturity in the scientific disciplines that rely on such explanations. The aim of this paper is to show why Quine’s verdict on dispositional explanations is untenable. First, it is argued that Quine does not attach importance to the fact that even the most mature theories in contemporary physics and biology quite often define their objects through the dispositional properties that these objects supposedly possess. An alternative analysis of dispositional explanations is then proposed, in terms of the inferences that these explanations allow for. The author’s analysis reveals that the inferential content which a dispositional explanation adds is often larger than the inferential content of the rival explanation that replaces the explanatory disposition with underlying structures or mechanisms. This result justifies the assertion that, at least in some cases, dispositional explanations do a better job and should therefore not be treated as a mark of scientific immaturity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Titel: |
КУАЙН ЗА ДИСПОЗИЦИОННИТЕ ОБЯСНЕНИЯ КАТО БЕЛЕГ ЗА НЕЗРЯЛА НАУКА И ЕДНА АЛТЕРНАТИВНА ГЛЕДНА ТОЧКА
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | ГУРОВА, ЛИЛИЯ |
Link: | |
Zeitschrift: | Philosophical Alternatives Journal / Filosofski Alternativi, 2018-12-01, Heft 6, S. 20-29 |
Veröffentlichung: | 2018 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0861-7899 (print) |
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