In Africa, about 70 percent of the total population still lives without electricity. Significant resources are needed to meet the gap. Demand-side management is crucial to curb the increasing demand even in developing countries. A traditional approach is to raise prices, but promoting energy-efficient products such as compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) bulbs is also a win-win proposition. While end-users can reduce their spending, power utilities can avoid costly investments in new generation capacity. This paper estimates the effects of progressive pricing as well as CFL distribution program in Ethiopia. It is found that the increasing block tariff structure reduced the demand: the price elasticity is estimated at 0.29. This is particularly useful to influence large-volume users, who are presumably the rich. The CFL program is also found effective to contain the electricity demand. The estimated impact is about 45 kWh per customer. This is significant energy savings particularly for low-volume users.
Keywords: impact evaluation; energy efficiency program; fixed-effect least-squares; fixed-effect quantile regression
Electric access is one of the most important development challenges in developing countries. Globally, it is estimated that about 1.3 billion people still do not have access to electricity ([
To this end, demand-side management is critical in developing countries, because it is particularly costly to develop new power generation capacity. In Africa, for instance, an additional 1 MW of installed capacity costs between US$0.3 million and US$0.5 million (figure 1).[
Graph: Figure 1. Annualized Investment and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs in Africa (US$ Million per MW) Source:[
Another policy option to manage the energy demand may be to promote energy-efficiency technologies, which is an inexpensive win-win proposition.[
Of course, the long-term sustainability remains debatable in developing countries, especially because CFL lamps contain about 4–5 mg of mercury per bulb, while incandescent lamps use no toxic material (e.g. [
The current paper aims at examining the effects of both pricing and a free CFL distribution program on residential energy consumption in Ethiopia. On one hand, the country uses an increasing block tariff structure to curb overconsumption of energy. On the other hand, Ethiopia carried out a series of CFL programs with more than nine million bulbs distributed in recent years.
Methodologically, a standard demand function for electricity is estimated with the effect of the CFL program incorporated. The CFL effect may be less obvious than it looks. First, enforcement is an issue. People may or may not use distributed bulbs as intended. There is general concern about CFL bulb quality. Incandescent lamps still outperform CFLs in terms of resemblance of original color, starting time, and frequency of switching ([
Second, the literature discusses the rebound and backfire effects of energy efficiency programs. It is well known that fuel-efficient car users drive more, not less, because of improved energy efficiency.[
To address these issues, this paper uses monthly panel data and estimates the household demand for electricity by the fixed-effect regression with score-matching. To investigate the distributional impact, a two-step fixed-effect quantile regression ([
Despite rapid economic growth in recent years, the Ethiopian electricity system remains largely underdeveloped. The national utility, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), has electrified about 45 percent of the country's towns and villages and currently serves about 2.1 million customers (or approximately 13 million people).[
In recent years, the Government of Ethiopia and EEPCO have been ramping up their efforts in two areas: universal electric access and demand-side management. EEPCO owns an installed capacity of about 2,000 MW and a distribution network of 126,000 km. In the early 2000s, EEPCO started expanding power access in rural and remote areas. Over the past five years, approximately 5,000 villages were electrified (figure 2). The total customer base of EEPCO increased from 800,000 in 2005 to two million in 2011. Still, about 11,000 villages remain to be electrified in the country. The national target is to achieve an electrification rate of 75 percent by 2015.
Graph: Figure 2. Number of Villages Electrified in Ethiopia Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
Graph: Figure 3. Block Rates of Electricity Tariffs in Ethiopia Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
As more people are connected, the demand for electricity is also increasing significantly. To curb the demand, EEPCO uses an increasing block tariff structure. The current tariff schedule has eight blocks where the marginal rate increases with power consumption from Birr 0.273 (or US$0.016) to Birr 0.694 (or US$0.04) per kWh (figure 3). Note that the real prices have been decreasing over time, because these nominal prices have not been adjusted for long time. Still, this progressive schedule is expected to contribute to controlling for the people's electricity demand.
To manage the increasing demand, EEPCO also implemented three CFL distribution programs in recent years. The first program was carried out in June to August 2009, distributing 350,000 CFL bulbs free of charge. The bulbs were distributed nationwide but practically focused on the capital city, Addis Ababa, because CFLs were allocated based on the number of existing customers per service center. The vast majority of the existing EEPCO customers live around Addis Ababa. Though the program was not targeted but implemented on a voluntary basis. Customers had to bring their old light bulbs to the nearest EEPCO service center. Thus, there is no enforcement issue in this case. Most of the program participants obtained a maximum of four CFL bulbs under the program.
Following the successful implementation of the first phase, the second and third CFL bulb distribution programs were implemented in July 2011 and January 2012, respectively. In total, 9.5 million CFL bulbs were distributed (table 1). The main difference from the first phase was that CFL bulbs were not distributed free of charge but sold at a significant discount (table 2). For instance, customers paid seven Ethiopian Birr (or US$0.40) for an 11 W CFL bulb while the market price was about Birr 25 (or US$1.42). The gap between the program and market prices was then financed by EEPCO and international development agencies.
Table 1. Engineering Calculations of Energy Savings Expected from the CFL Bulb Program
Incandescent bulb CFL bulb Savings per bulb Phase 1CFLs distributed Phase 2CFLs distributed Total Power savings (MW) 40 W 11 W 29 W 192,500 2,802,000 2,994,500 86.8 60 W 15 W 45 W 154,000 1,672,000 1,826,000 82.2 100 W 20 W 80 W 3,500 38,000 41,500 3.3 350,000 4,512,000 4,862,000 172.3
1 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
Table 2. CFL Bulb Market and Subsidized Prices
CFL bulb EEPCO-subsidized price Market price 11 W Birr 7 (US$0.40) Birr 25 (US$1.42) 15 W Birr 8 (US$0.45) Birr 27 (US$1.54)
2 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
To estimate the effects of the increasing block tariff as well as the CFL bulb distribution program, the following conditional demand function is considered:
\begin{eqnarray} kw{h_{it}} = \alpha CF{L_{it}} + {\beta _{MP}}M{P_{it}} + {\beta _D}{D_{it}} + {c_i} + {c_t} + {\varepsilon _{it}} \end{eqnarray}
(
MP denotes the marginal tariff rate, and D represents the [
There are two important empirical issues to estimate equation (
Second, the program participation was voluntary. Thus, CFL
In fact, the data show that there is a systematic difference prior to the distribution in energy use between the CFL program beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. The average energy consumption among the program participants is 187 kWh with the majority using less than 200 kWh (figure 4). On the other hand, the average energy consumption of nonbeneficiaries is 314 kWh, and many households consume more than 500 kWh per month (figure 5). It seems that low-volume electricity consumers, who are presumably the poor, were more willing to participate in the free CFL distribution program than high-volume users.
Graph: Figure 4. Energy Consumption by CFL Beneficiaries in May 2009 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
Graph: Figure 5. Energy Consumption by CFL Non-Beneficiaries in May 2009 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
Our sample data cover 4,000 customers living in the Bole-Kazanchis Service Area, Addis Ababa. This Service Area covers 13,000 customers in total, out of which about 3,500 customers received mostly four CFL bulbs under the first phase of the CFL program. The beneficiary identification numbers were matched with the EEPCO's customer database from which the historical power consumption records were derived in collaboration with EEPCO. 2,000 customers were randomly selected from the group of program participants (i.e. treatment group), and another 2,000 customers were also randomly selected from the nonparticipant (control) group. For each customer, monthly energy consumption and bill data were collected for the period: January 2007 to August 2012. This sample period was selected to cover at least two years before and after the program, respectively. In the sample, 60 percent of beneficiaries received CFL bulbs in June 2009, and the rest did in July 2009.
To mitigate the self-selection bias between the two groups, the fixed-effect regression model is used, which can remove common time- and group-specific effects as long as they are time-invariant (e.g. [
Graph: Figure 6. Average Electricity Consumption of CFL Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
Still, there may remain a risk of self-selection bias. To ensure comparability between program participants and nonparticipants in a statistical manner, a conventional matching technique is also applied. To match the two groups, the EEPCO's contract number is used. Note that the current analysis only uses the utility's administrative data and the list of the CFL program beneficiaries. It is expected that the contract numbers for program participants are systematically greater, because the contract numbers are normally assigned chronologically. Therefore, the smaller contract numbers are older customers (figure 7).[
Graph: Figure 7. EEPCO Contract Number and Date of Connection Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
Hence, our primary empirical model is the panel fixed-effect instrumental variable (FE IV) regression with score-matching. An alternative model is the random-effects model. The conventional specification test will be conducted to examine which model fits the underlying data better. In addition, a semi-parametric technique of quantile regression is also used to estimate the distributional impacts of the program. Quantile regression has the great advantage of capturing potential differences in the response of the dependent variable at different points. In our context, the program impacts can be different between low- and large-volume consumers. In addition, quantile regression is more efficient than least squares estimators if the error term is not normal (e.g. [
The two-stage fixed-effect quantile regression (2SFEQR) model can provide a consistent estimate as T increases ([
The summary statistics of our data are shown in table 3. An average customer (or household) uses about 250 kWh per month, paying on average Birr 62 or US$3.54. The monthly energy consumption is absolutely low but not minimal. This reflects the fact that the sample data are focused on the capital area where household income is relatively high in the country. Recall that our sample data are almost perfectly balanced for about 4,000 customers over the 67-month period (from January 2007 to July 2012). The program was implemented in June-July 2009. The dummy variable for CFL is set at one for one-fourth of the total observations, because program beneficiaries account for half of the sample, and they used the distributed CFLs in the second half of the sample period. The price variables are adjusted with inflation taken into account.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Monthly household power consumption (kWh) 254,964 250.40 252.40 0 11744.43 Dummy variable for CFL beneficiaries after the program implementation 254,964 0.28 0.45 0 1 Marginal tariff rate (Ethiopian Birr per kWh) 254,964 0.24 0.10 0.07 0.58 Nordin's difference variable (Ethiopian Birr) 254,964 −13.31 13.84 −79.17 0 Payment of power bill (Ethiopian Birr) 254,964 62.08 80.56 0.10 2939.92
3 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
First of all, the propensity score-matching is applied. One probit regression is performed for every cohort (year-month) set of participating customers since the group of potential control customers changes over time. As expected, customers with greater contract numbers, who had been connected more recently, were more likely to participate in the CFL program (table 4). Only partial results are shown for several selected cohorts. In total, 3,979 observations are found outside of the common support, which is an overlap between the propensity scores of the beneficiary group and those of nonbeneficiaries, and excluded from the following analysis. The lack of common support implies that the instrument does not work to find matches between the two groups.
Table 4. Probit Results for Propensity Score Matching
Cohort Jan 2007 June 2009 July 2012 0.51 (0.16)*** 0.53 (0.16)*** 0.54 (0.16)*** Constant −0.17 (0.06)*** −0.17 (0.06)*** −0.18 (0.06)*** Obs. 3,984 3,969 3,975 Pseudo R2 0.0019 0.0020 0.0022 LR chi2 10.39 11.17 11.86
- 4 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
- 5 Notes: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for the treatment group. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
Then, the fixed-effect OLS regression is performed, although this is likely to be biased, as discussed above. Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. As expected, the estimated CFL bulb impact is found to be negative (table 5). However, the coefficient of the marginal price turned out insignificant, contradicting economic theory. This OLS result may have captured the characteristics of the increasing block tariff schedule under which higher block rates are applied to larger-volume consumers. Formally, the conventional exogeneity test indicates that the marginal price and Nordin's difference variable are not exogenous. The chi-squared test statistic with a degree of freedom of 69 is estimated at 25,708.35, well above the conventional threshold.
To address the endogeneity issue, the instrumental-variable fixed-effect (IV FE) regression is used. The impact of the CFL bulb distribution is estimated at 45.5 kWh per household, which is statistically significant. Hence, each bulb could save energy by 11 kWh per month.[
Table 5. Fixed- and Random-Effect Regression with Score Matching
FE OLS FE IV Random effect IV CFL −34.39 (2.66)*** −45.54 (2.98)*** −47.75 (2.99)*** MP −13.41 (26.64) −295.94 (32.57)*** −274.78 (32.84)*** D −10.84 (0.22)*** −14.54 (0.26)*** −14.95 (0.26)*** Constant 9.54 (8.53) 51.24 (7.15)*** 31.21 (7.15)*** Obs. 266,033 258,747 258,747 No. of groups 3998 3993 3993 R-squared: Within 0.372 0.311 0.340 Between 0.882 0.882 0.882 Overall 0.668 0.665 0.666 F stat 180.94 Wald stat 15862.74 17603.51 Elasticity: MP −0.01 (0.03) −0.29 (0.03)*** −0.27 (0.03)*** D 0.57 (0.01)*** 0.77 (0.01)*** 0.79 (0.01)***
- 6 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
- 7 Notes: The dependent variable is KWH. Clustered standard errors at the household level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
When the price endogeneity is taken into account, the price elasticity turned out to be negative and significant. The elasticity is estimated at −0.29 in the FE IV model. This is relatively small in absolute terms compared with the existing literature but reasonable in our case, because many households are still using electricity for basic living needs. In theory, the elasticity with respect to the Nordin's D is a mirror of income elasticity. The estimated elasticity is relatively high at 0.77, indicating the increasing electricity demand as the economy grows. This reconfirms the importance of demand-side management.
Even if the logarithm is taken on both sides, the main results are broadly the same (table 6). The OLS result seems to be biased. The price elasticity is positive, and the effect of CFL is less significant. According to the FE IV, the coefficient of CFL is negative at −0.025, which is significant. The price elasticity is much higher than previously estimated, and, on the other hand, the income elasticity implied by the Nordin's D coefficient is very close to the previous estimate.[
To assess the distributional effect, the two-stage fixed-effect quantile model is used with clustered standard errors used at the household level.[
Table 6. Fixed- and Random-Effect Regression with the Logarithmic Specification
FE OLS FE IV Random effect IV CFL −0.012 (0.007)* −0.025 (0.009)*** −0.025 (0.009)*** lnMP 1.925 (0.051)*** −2.027 (0.158)*** −2.034 (0.158)*** lnD −0.156 (0.008)*** −0.857 (0.030)*** −0.859 (0.030)*** Constant 6.490 (0.067)*** 1.219 (0.217)*** 1.206 (0.216)*** Obs. 258,747 258,747 258,747 No. of groups 3993 3993 3993 R-squared: Within 0.673 0.509 0.580 Between 0.940 0.883 0.883 Overall 0.851 0.765 0.765 F stat 452.4 Wald stat 730398 33541.5
- 8 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
- 9 Notes: The dependent variable is lnKWH. Clustered standard errors at the household level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
Table 7. Distributional Effects: IV Fixed-Effect Quantile Regression
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 CFL −48.17 (0.66)*** −55.91 (0.56)*** −66.71 (0.66)*** −78.32 (0.73)*** −87.13 (0.92)*** MP −47.65 (5.29)*** −146.19 (5.74)*** −346.92 (7.28)*** −618.14 (8.33)*** −856.85 (11.06)*** D −10.59 (0.06)*** −12.07 (0.06)*** −14.76 (0.08)*** −18.50 (0.09)*** −22.32 (0.13)*** Constant −35.26 (1.06)*** 0.56 (1.01) 56.58 (1.31)*** 122.06 (1.32)*** 176.75 (1.81)*** Obs. 258,747 258,747 258,747 258,747 258,747 No. of clusters 3993 3993 3993 3993 3993 Pseudo R2 0.700 0.706 0.711 0.709 0.705 Elasticity: MP −0.14 (0.016)*** −0.33 (0.013)*** −0.57 (0.012)*** −0.77 (0.010)*** −0.87 (0.010)*** D 1.76 (0.010)*** 1.47 (0.007)*** 1.31 (0.006)*** 1.26 (0.005)*** 1.23 (0.005)***
- 10 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
- 11 Notes: The dependent variable is KWH. Clustered standard errors at the household level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
In relative terms, however, the program impact is larger for low-volume power users, who are probably the poor. For the first quantile, the estimated energy savings accounted for 60 percent of their predicted power consumption (figure 8). This is because lighting is their primary energy use. By contrast, the relative impact is much smaller for large-volume power consumers; the achieved energy savings represent only about 35 percent of their total power consumption. Households in this group may use a lot of electricity for other purposes, too.
Graph: Figure 8. Absolute and Relative Impacts of CFL Bulb Distribution by Quantile Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
The price and income elasticities also vary among quantiles. Price elasticity is the lowest among the first quantile. This reflects the fact that the electricity demand by the poor is mostly to meet basic needs. As household income increases, customers may have more flexibility in energy consumption. For instance, people may afford more energy-efficient home appliances. As a result, price elasticity tends to be higher for the rich. The result is consistent with the literature, such as [
Regarding income elasticity, it tends to be higher for low-volume customers. The elasticity is estimated at 1.76 among the first quantile. The elasticity is still positive at 1.23 but relatively low compared with low-volume customers. This can be interpreted to mean that electricity is not a luxury good but rather a necessity. Therefore, as the economy grows, the power demand is likely to increase disproportionally. The demand by the low-volume users would likely increase most vigorously.
The policy implications are straightforward. Both pricing and CFL bulb distribution programs are effective to manage the electricity demand. First, price incentives, such as increasing block rates, work well even in developing countries where prices are often kept relatively low because of the affordability issue. Still, the measured price elasticity is found to be significant and particularly high in absolute terms for large-volume users. Thus, pricing should be a main policy instrument to rationalize the increasing electricity demand among the rich.
The CFL bulb distribution program is also found to be cost-effective in Ethiopia. The marginal rate applied to those who consume the average amount of energy is Birr 0.55 or US$0.032 per kWh. A CFL bulb costs Birr 25–27 or US$1.42–1.54 in the market (see table 2 above). As shown above, the average energy saving is 45.5 kWh per household or 11 kWh per bulb; the payback period is estimated at about four months. In addition, the normal lifetime of CFL bulbs is 8,000–10,000 hours, which is much longer than that of incandescent lamps. Incandescent lamps usually last 1,000–2,000 hours (e.g. [
From the utility perspective, the CFL program is considered to have contributed significantly to keep the required capacity low. In rural Ethiopia, lighting is used for four hours: one hour in the morning and three hours in the evening ([
One might be concerned about the possible contamination effect of the second phase of the CFL program which was implemented in July 2011. Nonbeneficiaries from the first phase may have benefited from the second phase and vice versa. To check robustness of our estimation results, the FE IV regression was performed with the sample panel data limited up to June 2010 (table 8). The results are broadly the same as the main results shown above. The magnitude of the CFL effect is slightly smaller in both linear and logarithmic specifications. This implies that the first phase beneficiaries also benefited again from the second phase program, therefore intensifying the measured effect by the program variable, CFL. It also means that large-volume electricity users seem to remain nonparticipants in the second or third phase of the program; they are less interested in bringing old lamps to the EEPCO service centers to replace them with new ones.
Table 8. Fixed–Effect IV Regression with Limited Sample Data Before the 2nd Phase CFL Program
Dependent var. Kwh lnkwh CFL −31.00 (2.42)*** −0.019 (0.008)** MP −87.18 (28.26)*** D −11.69 (0.23)*** lnMP −1.33 (0.14)*** lnD −0.71 (0.03)*** Constant 22.13 (8.67)** 2.20 (0.19)*** Obs. 209,190 209,190 No. of groups 3993 3993 R-squared: Within 0.354 0.523 Between 0.888 0.886 Overall 0.708 0.780 Wald stat 14808.36 580258.5 Elasticity: MP −0.10 (0.03)*** −1.33 (0.14)*** D 0.69 (0.01)*** 0.71 (0.03)***
- 12 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
- 13 Notes: Clustered standard errors at the household level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
One might also think that average prices are more important than marginal rates when examining the residential electricity demand. As shown above, our data support the fact that, as economic theory predicts, the marginal price has an important role to play in curbing the electricity demand. Still, there is a practical view that households are only interested in average prices to consider their electricity consumption. In the sample, average real price is 0.227 Birr per kWh, with a wide variation from 0.081 to 9.21 Birr. The results are shown in table 9. In the linear specification, the price elasticity is estimated at 0.39, not negative. When the logarithm is taken on both sides, the coefficient (i.e. elasticity) is 1.09, still positive. These results are consistent with our prior expectation, because the underlying pricing system adopts an increasing block tariff structure where higher prices are applied when people use more electricity. The positive elasticities must capture this relationship.
Table 9. Fixed–Effect OLS Regression with Average Prices
Dependent var. kwh lnkwh CFL −5.77 (3.50)* 0.03 (0.01)** Avg. Price 429.33 (129.10)*** lnAvg. Price 1.09 (0.16)*** Constant 63.20 (48.60) 6.09 (0.16)*** Obs. 258,747 258,747 No. of groups 3993 3993 R-squared: Within 0.074 0.101 Between 0.420 0.529 Overall 0.119 0.278 F stat 59.26 139.60 Elasticity: Avg. Price 0.39 (0.12)*** 1.09 (0.16)***
- 14 Source: Authors' own calculation based on data provided by EEPCO.
- 15 Notes: Clustered standard errors at the household level are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
The CFL effect seems less conclusive with the average price variable. In the linear model, the coefficient of CFL is negative as expected, but the magnitude is much smaller than the estimate with the marginal price. Moreover, in the logarithmic specification, the coefficient turned out to be positive: CFL bulbs might have raised the electricity consumption. This is less convincing and seemingly indicating the validity of using the marginal prices in the demand estimation with our data.
Electricity infrastructure is one of the most important development challenges in Africa. In the region, about 585 million people, or roughly 70 percent of the total population, are still living without access to power. Significant resources are required to address the existing infrastructure gap. Demand-side management is crucial to curb the increasing demand. A traditional approach is to raise energy prices. Another is to promote energy efficiency. The latter can be an inexpensive, win-win proposition. While end users can reduce their energy costs, power utilities can avoid costly investments in developing new generation capacity. Furthermore, energy efficiency can contribute to mitigating global warming.
Ethiopia has been implementing both approaches: it adopts the increasing block tariff and carried out a series of energy-efficiency programs at the end user level to manage the increasing demand for electricity. The current paper evaluates both the increasing block tariff structure and the first CFL bulb distribution program implemented in June-August 2009. The evidence suggests that both are important to manage the demand. Price instruments are more effective to influence the demand of large-volume power consumers (i.e. the rich). The CFL effect is also significant. However, because the lighting demand is only a small fraction of their electricity demand, the CFL program has a relatively modest effect on these customers.
By contrast, the CFL program is effective to curb the electricity demand among low-volume users (i.e. the poor). It was shown that the CFL program mostly benefited the poor. The program was not targeted, but customers themselves had to bring old incandescent lamps to EEPCO service centers. As a result, the program turned out to be pro-poor. The evidence clearly shows that the CFL bulb distribution program contributed to reducing electricity consumption by about 45 kWh per customer. The payback period is four months, clearly suggesting the cost effectiveness of CFL bulbs at the end user level. Unlike the pricing mechanism, the free-of-charge or discounted distribution is also useful to address the affordability issue.
It was shown that the program had the distributional effects. In absolute terms, large-volume power consumers achieved the largest energy savings. However, in relative terms, lower-volume consumers benefited most from the program. For the poorest (i.e. first quantile customers), the estimated energy savings accounted for 60 percent of their total power consumption.
Although the potential self-selection bias is expected to be removed largely by the individual-specific fixed-effect c
To deal with this problem, we need extraneous information (i.e. instrumental variables). Following the traditional approach in the literature (e.g. [
\begin{eqnarray} Bil{l_{ij}} = {\gamma _{1j}} + {\gamma _{2j}}kw{h_{ij}} + {u_{ij}}, \end{eqnarray}
(
Atsushi Iimi (corresponding author) is a Senior Economist in Transport & ICT Global Practice of the World Bank where he specializes in development economics in Africa; his email address is aiimi@worldbank.org. Raihan Elahi is a Lead Energy Specialist in Energy & Extractives Global Practice of the World Bank; his email address is relahi@worldbank.org. Rahul Kitchlu is a Senior Energy Specialist in Energy & Extractives Global Practice of the World Bank; his email address is rkitchlu@worldbank.org. Peter Costolanski used to be a consultant working at the World Bank; his email address is pcostolanski@gmail.com.
By Atsushi Iimi; Raihan Elahi; Rahul Kitchlu and Peter Costolanski
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