System-level Non-interference for Constant-time Cryptography
In: ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'14 ; https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01101950 ; ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2014
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Zugriff:
International audience ; Cache-based attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that are particularly effective in virtualized or cloud-based en-vironments, where they have been used to recover secret keys from cryptographic implementations. One common ap-proach to thwart cache-based attacks is to use constant-time implementations, i.e. which do not branch on secrets and do not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. How-ever, there is no rigorous proof that constant-time implemen-tations are protected against concurrent cache-attacks in virtualization platforms with shared cache; moreover, many prominent implementations are not constant-time. An alter-native approach is to rely on system-level mechanisms. One recent such mechanism is stealth memory, which provisions a small amount of private cache for programs to carry po-tentially leaking computations securely. Stealth memory in-duces a weak form of constant-time, called S-constant-time, which encompasses some widely used cryptographic imple-mentations. However, there is no rigorous analysis of stealth memory and S-constant-time, and no tool support for check-ing if applications are S-constant-time. We propose a new information-flow analysis that checks if an x86 application executes in constant-time, or in S-constant-time. Moreover, we prove that constant-time (resp. S-constant-time) programs do not leak confidential infor-mation through the cache to other operating systems exe-cuting concurrently on virtualization platforms (resp. plat-forms supporting stealth memory). The soundness proofs are based on new theorems of independent interest, includ-ing isolation theorems for virtualization platforms (resp. plat-forms supporting stealth memory), and proofs that constant-time implementations (resp. S-constant-time implementa-tions) are non-interfering with respect to a strict information flow policy which disallows that control flow and memory ac-cesses depend on secrets. We formalize our results using the Coq proof assistant and we demonstrate the ...
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System-level Non-interference for Constant-time Cryptography
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Barthe, Gilles ; Betarte, Gustavo ; Campo, Juan Diego ; Luna, Carlos ; Pichardie, David ; Institute IMDEA Software Madrid ; Universidad de la República Montevideo (UDELAR) ; Software certification with semantic analysis (CELTIQUE) ; Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-LANGAGE ET GÉNIE LOGICIEL (IRISA-D4) ; Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires (IRISA) ; Université de Rennes (UR)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes) ; Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-École normale supérieure - Rennes (ENS Rennes)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Télécom Bretagne-CentraleSupélec-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes) ; Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-École normale supérieure - Rennes (ENS Rennes)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Télécom Bretagne-CentraleSupélec-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires (IRISA) ; Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-École normale supérieure - Rennes (ENS Rennes)-Télécom Bretagne-CentraleSupélec-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) |
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Zeitschrift: | ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'14 ; https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01101950 ; ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2014 |
Veröffentlichung: | HAL CCSD ; ACM, 2014 |
Medientyp: | Konferenz |
DOI: | 10.1145/2660267.2660283 |
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