A practical timing attack on RSA over a LAN
In: Data mining, intrusion detection, information assurance, and data networks security 2006 (17-18 April 2006, Kissimmee, Florida, USA)Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering :624111.1-624111.9
Konferenz
- print, 9 ref 1
Zugriff:
Today, the specific implementation of a cryptosystem is of possibly greater importance than the underlying cryptographic algorithm itself. Through side-channel cryptanalysis, an adversary may deduce a secret key just by monitoring implementation-specific side channels, such as execution time or power consumption during a cryptographic operation. In this paper, we describe a successful remote timing attack against a server running a protocol similar to SSL. Using a fully-automated attack on Chinese Remaindering Theorem (CRT) implementations of RSA, we show it is practical to recover a 1024-bit key in under an hour over a local area network.
Titel: |
A practical timing attack on RSA over a LAN
|
---|---|
Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | LODATO, Mark J ; JOUNY, Ismail |
Link: | |
Quelle: | Data mining, intrusion detection, information assurance, and data networks security 2006 (17-18 April 2006, Kissimmee, Florida, USA)Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering :624111.1-624111.9 |
Veröffentlichung: | Bellingham, Wash: SPIE, 2006 |
Medientyp: | Konferenz |
Umfang: | print, 9 ref 1 |
ISSN: | 0277-786X (print) |
Schlagwort: |
|
Sonstiges: |
|