State, Law, and Insecurity in South Sudan

Between 2005 and 2011, when South Sudan was preparing for separation, foreign analysts, journalists, and human rights groups had various predictions about what was about to become the world's newest country: that it was going to be a "pre-failed state," in the words of The Economist ; that it was going to exemplify the classic definition of what political scientists call a weak state; or that it would simply become another oil kleptocracy, incapable of transforming itself into the democratic state for which its citizens had yearned and died. Others pointed to the history of militancy and ethnic violence that had engulfed the country throughout the 1990s, speculating that if these conflicts were not addressed properly and quickly, South Sudan would most likely implode. There was indeed no shortage of challenges that could derail every promise the idea of independence represented for the people of this young nation. But violence, ethnic-based or militia-inspired, was the issue many commentators cited as the single most important concern for the citizens. It was also the greatest consideration for those who predicted the demise of the state, especially because ethnic fault lines often lead to the disintegration of states, even though causes of disintegration may be rooted in the many political, economic, and historical complexities of colonialism, wars of liberation, local competitions, or disregard for the rule of law by some institutions, including the security organs and the nation's army. These predictions outraged many of South Sudan's leaders, who dismissed ...