More than a decade ago, re searchers reported that elementary and secondary students found social studies uninteresting because they failed to see the relevance of the subject to their own lives and because they found it boring, too detailed, and redundant (Shaughnessy and Haladyna 1985; Shug, Todd, and Beery 1984). Classroom activities generally involved listening to teachers, reading textbooks, completing worksheets, and taking quizzes. Tests, usually in form of multiple choice, true or false, matching, and filling in the blanks, rarely required more than recalling memorized facts (Goodlad 1984). Some researchers have even argued that American society has little sense of the past and that the study of history is hampered by a cultural lack of interest (Downey and Levstik 1988; Levstik 1997). More recently, the controversy over national curriculum standards for history substantially centered on the question of how to find an appropriate balance between a focus on content knowledge and a focus on process skills such as chronological thinking, historical comprehension, historical analysis and interpretation, historical research capabilities, and historical issues analysis and decision making (Doppen and Yeager 1999; Nash, Crabtree, and Dunn 1998; NCHS 1996; NCSS 1994; Seixas 1994). Although the debate over national curriculum standards has subsided for now, the implementation of curriculum standards continues unabated and quietly at the state and local level, where teachers are adapting and supplementing the rigid guidelines with their own ideas and instructional materials (Brophy and VanSledright 1997).
The idea of teaching historical thinking to students as a way to engage them in history study has been the focus of social studies research in recent years. Booth (1980, 1993) has resisted any model of the development of children's thinking that is allied tightly to ages and stages because it limits the expectation of what children can do. To him, history is an adductive process in which someone asks an open-ended question about past events and finds answers that provide a satisfactory "fit." Supporting Booth's research, others have argued that less-able students sometimes demonstrate historical understanding and that the acquisition of historical understanding is in fact a domain-specific learning process (Ashby and Lee 1987; Dickinson, Lee, and Rogers 1984; Downey and Levstik 1991; Levstik and Pappas 1992; Thornton and Vukelich, 1988).
Researching historical understanding among young children, Barton and Levstik (1996) have found that even the youngest children are able to make basic distinctions in historical time. Their study revealed that before the third grade, dates had little meaning for children, although third and fourth graders did understand the numerical basis of dates. Only by fifth grade were students able to connect particular dates extensively with specific background knowledge. In another study, Levstik and Pappas (1987) found that fourth and sixth grade children had developed an understanding of history as a specifically human condition. Levstik (1995) also found that sixth graders are spontaneously skeptical of their social studies text and able to recognize that another perspective could have been presented. Confirming her findings, Foster and Yeager (1999) have observed similar results among twelve-year-old students in England.
Barton (1996) observed that fourth and fifth grade students thought of historical changes as having come about as part of a rational development toward the present. They also placed all historical developments into a linear sequence to the present and tended to collapse the past into a minimal number of people and events. His suggestion to counter that perception of historical change is to focus instruction on the diversity of experience of a given time period by engaging students in meaningful questions, especially those related to social history (Barton 1997).
A few researchers have focused their research on historical thinking among secondary students. Foster and Morris (1996) found that American history textbooks commonly used in high schools across the country fail to present multiple perspectives. In an analysis of six world history textbooks, Foster and Rosh (1997) likewise found that historical events are more frequently depicted from a limited Western perspective. In addition, Davis and Klages (1997) found that teaching in the high school focuses on content rather than process and consequently produces students who easily forget what they supposedly have learned.
Comparing actual historians at work with high school students, Wineburg (1991a, 1991b) found that although high school students can know a lot of history, they still have little idea of how historical knowledge is constructed because they remain ignorant of the basic heuristics used to create historical interpretations. Wineburg likened the historians to "prosecuting attorneys" and the high school students to "patiently listening jurors" who simply failed to comprehend the subtext of hidden and latent meanings. In addition, he found that their understanding was limited to which "side" a document was on.
Others have focused their research on secondary student-teachers' thinking about historical texts. In one study, Yeager and Davis (1995) found that there was a clear relationship between student-teachers' lack of understanding of historical thinking and the ways in which they were taught in high school and college. In another study (1996), the same authors found that some of the teachers did not focus on teaching historical thinking because they could not recall any explicit attention to it in their academic courses. In yet another study, Yeager and Wilson (1997) found that when a social studies methods course did emphasize historical inquiry and analysis, student-teachers tended to incorporate historical thinking activities in their teaching. Several of these student-teachers indicated that the methods course had made them more reflective of their teaching.
Bohan and Davis (1998) used Wineburg's research design as a model to analyze the historical thinking of three secondary social studies student-teachers. The inquiry focused on an analysis of a written essay based on sixteen sources related to the dropping of the atomic bomb. The authors found that all essays revealed inexperience with the process of historical inquiry and writing, that the student teachers, similar to the students in Wineburg's study (1991a), often failed to consider the context in which a document was written and instead focused on which "side" a document supported.
Levstik (1997) has argued that school history too often ignores historical thinking by presenting a unitary, sanitized version of what happened in the past. She contends that although perspectival history runs counter to children's perceived need to know "the truth," it is imperative that they be asked to consider multiple perspectives. A key factor in the teaching of multiple perspectives is that it provides a way to make history interesting by making it meaningful and relevant to students' contemporary lives. As Seixas (1994, 1997) has suggested, a historical phenomenon can only become significant if a contemporary community of learners can draw relationships between itself and a past experience. George Herbert Mead, as quoted in Seixas (1996), contended that "history is always 'an interpretation of the present.'" Rather than accept student comments such as "I mean, it's not going to help us when we grow up or anything," social studies teachers must teach a more performance-based "new history" in which students construct their own meaning.
Researchers suggest that while teaching multiple perspectives secondary teachers should pay special attention to the concept of historical empathy. Foster (1999) has suggested that historical empathy requires attention to six separate aspects of historical thinking; that it is a process that leads to an understanding and explanation of why people in the past acted as they did; that it involves an appreciation of historical context and chronology in the evaluation of past events; that it is reliant upon a thorough analysis and evaluation of historical evidence; that it involves an appreciation of the consequences of actions perpetrated in the past; that it demands an intuitive sense of a bygone era and an implicit recognition that the past is different from the present; and that it requires a respect for, an appreciation of, and a sensitivity toward, the complexity of human action and achievement.
In a forthcoming study, Foster and Yeager (in press) suggest the importance of empathy in the development of historical understanding. Extending the research of others (Ashby and Lee 1997; Portal 1987; Shemilt 1980), the authors contend that empathy merits specific attention because historians must bring it to their inquiry in order to analyze the events, actions, and words of key figures in the historical record. They argue that the development of historical empathy is "a considered and active process, embedded in the historical method," which involves four interrelated phases: the introduction of a historical event necessitating the analysis of human action, the understanding of historical context and chronology, the analysis of a variety of historical evidence and interpretations, and the construction of a narrative framework through which historical conclusions are reached. Thus, the central aim of the historian, and perhaps the most important task in the teaching and learning of history, is "to make sense of the past." The history teacher's goal, then, should be to be able to say that students are "in a position to entertain a set of beliefs and values which are not necessarily their own" (Ashby and Lee 1987).
The focus of the study reported here was to expand on a recent exploratory study in historical empathy and to further investigate how historical empathy can help to give students a richer understanding of the past. In a exploratory study, Yeager and his colleagues (1999) compared the written narratives of two groups of four U.S. history students. All eight high school juniors were approximately sixteen years old at the time of the study. Although each group read about the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one group only read from a standard high school textbook, whereas the other group used a wide range of multiperspectival sources. The authors found that the students who had many sources at their disposal were able to construct insightful, accurate narratives that also incorporated their own perspectives on the bombing.
The participants in the present study were eighty-eight sophomore students in four separate sections of world history (not an honors course) at the P. K. Yonge Developmental Research School at the University of Florida. The group consisted of forty-nine male and thirty-nine female students who were mostly fifteen years old. Fifty-three of the students were white, twenty-seven African American, and eight Hispanic.
To ascertain the students' preexisting knowledge, they were given a pretest in which they answered the following questions:
The central focus of the study was the development of the students' historical understanding through an analysis of eighteen documents on President Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan. As in Bohan and Davis's study (1998), direct instruction about the historical events surrounding the development and use of the atomic bomb was deliberately kept to a minimum to encourage the students to do their own historical thinking.
After an introductory lesson based on a time line of significant events and a presentation summarizing the aforementioned research on empathy, the students were divided into heterogeneous groups of four. Each student received copies of the eighteen documents (see appendix) and an investigation sheet with questions intended to guide the group's "think aloud" sessions.
Documents 1-3 were excerpts from three world history textbooks commonly found in American high schools, whereas documents 4-7 were excerpts from three films, each of which presents a different perspective. Documents 8-18 presented several other perspectives, including those of historians, political leaders, and victims.
Each group's "think aloud" session was guided by the following student investigation sheet based on Foster's suggestions (1997):
After completing their "think aloud" sessions, each group had to write a report on its findings, which one member had to present to the class. For the report, each group followed a specific format in which it listed arguments and cited documents in favor and against Truman's decision and followed that with questions for further group inquiry.
As a follow-up activity, students were required to prepare a museum display on the use of the atomic bomb. To further clarify the controversial nature of such a display, the students read "The historians' letter to the Smithsonian" dated July 31, 1995. This footnoted letter, signed by fifty-two prominent historians, raised numerous objections against the Smithsonian's scheduled Enola Gay exhibit. In the follow-up class discussion, the students were encouraged to present multiple perspectives in their display to avoid the kind of criticism that had been raised against the Smithsonian exhibit.
Next, the students reviewed examples of high-quality displays, with a focus on appropriate content and layout. They considered the nature of the exhibit and the use maps, timelines, and other pertinent illustrations. The students then conducted independent research in the library and on the Internet, where many excellent sites are available (see list of Web sites on page 168). As a concluding assignment, all students were required to write a personal, reflective essay in which they had to present their own personal perspective on the use of the bomb.
One week after the completion of the unit, the students completed an unannounced posttest identical to the pretest. Three weeks later, they were given a last opportunity to provide qualitative feedback through a questionnaire that included the following questions:
A pretest revealed that one in four students did not know in what year the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb and chose not to give any answer. Although more than one third of all students knew that the atomic bomb was first used during the 1940s, only nine students knew that 1945 was the correct answer. More than one tenth of all students believed that the atomic bomb had first been used during the early 1960s, perhaps during the Cuban missile crisis. Eleven students knew that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima as well as Nagasaki. Although seventeen students listed only Hiroshima, not a single student listed only Nagasaki. In total, more than half of all students were able to list Hiroshima as the site of an atomic bomb explosion.
When asked to list as many reasons as possible why the United States decided to drop the atomic bomb, one out of every four students was unable to list a single reason. The majority, nearly three out of every five students, were able to list one or two reasons. "To show American strength" and "to end the war" were each listed twenty times; "to seek revenge for Pearl Harbor" was listed fifteen times; and "to conduct a scientific experiment" was listed twelve times. The reason "to kill Japanese nationals" was listed six times, and "to save lives" and because of "Japan's refusal to surrender" were each mentioned only twice.
The students were very divided about the morality of the decision to use the atomic bomb. More than one in four students believed that dropping the bomb was right, and nearly two in five believed that it was wrong. A very small number of students suggested the possibility of multiple perspectives, making reference to Japanese motives for war and to disagreement within the United States over the use of the bomb. In addition, more than one in five students either wrote that they did not know the answer or simply left the space blank. Students who believed that using the bomb was the right decision argued that it saved lives and money, ended the war, and showed America's power to the world. Arguments against the bomb's use focused mainly on the belief that it is wrong to kill innocent people. A few students did refer to nuclear fallout and the destructive effect of the atomic bomb on the environment. Thus, although most students had some preexisting knowledge, the pretest confirmed that they essentially lacked a multiperspectival interpretation of the decision.
Nearly all students worked diligently throughout the "think aloud" sessions. They were often involved in serious discussions about the evidence a particular document provided. All groups completed the sessions in two to three regular fifty-minute class periods. Most decided to answer each question for each document systematically and tried to determine whether the content supported or rejected Truman's decision.
Although some groups were more meticulous than others in citing sources, their reports were reflective of the genuine discussions that occurred throughout the "think aloud" sessions. A summary of their thoughts and ideas follows.
One group wrote that it got "a sense of many points of view of both primary and secondary sources which help us get a better idea of what it was really like. Truman's decision was probably the most difficult decision he had to make in his presidency and maybe in his life time. He had the power of this incredible bomb and the well being of his country, but also the guilt of the people this bomb could and did indeed destroy." Another group wrote, "Our group is undecided as to whether Truman was right or wrong. We feel that there are many facts that are not presented correctly or are controversial. . . . Questions that we feel have not been answered are the amount of American and Japanese casualties, whether Japan was ready to surrender, and why Japan and the United States were at war in the first place. Once these questions are answered we may be able to form a conclusion."
Some groups were unable to reach a consensus, and one reported, "Our considerations are split. Two of the members believe that it was good to drop the bomb the first time but not the second. Without the bomb, warfare would have cost more lives on both sides. The United States along with other nations would have been forced to invade and many would have died in combat. The two other members believe it wasn't good to drop the bomb at all. The bomb was a very destructive device and shouldn't have been used at all. In the Trinity test, they saw the impact of the bomb as it completely demolished the tower from which it had been dropped."
Yet another group reported, "Some of the things that we were unclear about were whether or not Japan knew about America's decision to drop the bomb and the power and destruction that the atomic bomb would leave behind. Another thing was how close Japan was to surrendering before the bomb was dropped. It was basically Japan against the world and maybe a simple threat to use the atomic bomb would have scared them into surrendering." Although raising these concerns the group nonetheless decided that the "dropping of the atomic bomb was the right decision at the time." Addressing some to the same concerns about Japan's knowledge about the bomb, another group even suggested that "if we wanted to destroy the morale of the Japanese, why didn't we just drop the bomb on the imperial palace?"
Throughout the museum display part of the assignment, the students were enthusiastic about the opportunity to exhibit what they had learned. They were often involved in vehement discussions about the layout as well as content of their poster board display. In almost all groups, each student was involved in the effort to create a quality display, and many students came in after class hours to complete the assignment.
The museum displays revealed that the students paid great attention to the layout. Most displays were completed in somber black and white, with illustrations that included professional-looking borders. Most groups included maps of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as brief time lines with significant dates and events and pictures related to the bombings. Most groups, however, struggled with the content part of their display. A few groups included text that they had written themselves, but many used materials they took verbatim from the Internet, without examining them for accuracy or appropriateness. Almost all groups also found it difficult to create a display that presented multiple perspectives on the use of the bomb. Only a few of the displays included materials related to domestic disagreements over the use of the bomb or a perspective other than the American. Most displays simply focused on the actual bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their aftermath.
In the final reflective essay, the students revealed their personal perspectives. For example, in defense of Truman's decision, students wrote that "the pros outweigh the cons. . . . Japan should have surrendered at least after the first bomb," that it "cut losses to a minimum and drew the war to an end quickly," that "the Japanese were trying to kill us and if they had the atomic bomb, they would have used it," and that it "put fear into the minds of other countries."
Questioning the president's decision, students wrote that Truman was lying when he tried "to say that God would justify the bomb and the killing," that Japan was ready to surrender "as long as they could have kept their emperor," that he "could have demonstrated to the world the power that the U.S.A. had with the atomic bomb," perhaps "on some deserted island," and that the "scientists at Los Alamos [had] encouraged" him to do so.
Many students were able to make clear references to multiple perspectives in their individual essays. One student wrote that "the pros and cons balance each other out pretty well. . . . From the American side, it was the right thing to do because it won the war for them; they didn't care about the Japanese when they were at war with them. From the Japanese side, it was the wrong thing to do because they were ready to surrender, just not unconditionally which would make them lose their emperor." Another student wrote that surrender would have come sooner if America had withdrawn its demand that the Japanese give up "their emperor system. . . . The United States should have also given some time after the first bombing for talks of surrender to take place instead of dropping a second bomb." In addition, the student wrote, "the Soviet Union had promised to enter the war in early August which would have likely forced Japan to surrender. Japan knew . . . that it could not take on a fight against the United States, Britain and Russia. The United States also dropped the bomb for reasons that should never have played a role in the decision. The U.S. wanted revenge against the Japanese for bombing Pearl Harbor to prove their superiority to the Soviet Union who became a chief rival in the postwar."
Looking into the future, others wrote that "the bomb was a good thing because now all the world knows how much desolation and destruction" it causes and that "hopefully we will have enough sense not to drop it ever again." Referring to the U.S. role as international arbitrator in today's world, another wrote that if the United States had become "involved sooner, there would have been another resolution" and that using "its power in places like Kosovo can help prevent violent bloody wars, like WWII, from happening again in our future."
The posttest revealed that nearly all students were able to identify that the bomb was used during the 1940s. In fact, eighty-two of the eighty-eight students were able to identify 1945 as the correct year. Similarly, all students were able to identify Hiroshima, and eighty-four were able to identify both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
More important, not only did the students give more reasons for the use of the atomic bomb, but their lists of reasons showed a dramatic qualitative shift. Nearly three out of five could now list two or three reasons, and although dropping the atomic bomb to end the war remained the most often listed reason (58 times), the argument that it was intended as a show of American strength dropped to fifth place (21 times). The argument that the atomic bomb was used to obtain scientific results rose from fourth to second place (37 times). Other reasons showing a substantial increase were the desire to save lives (35 times) and Japan's refusal to surrender (34 times), but the argument that the bombing was a revenge for Pearl Harbor dropped to sixth place (10 times).
Although the number of students (two out of five) who decided that the use of the bomb was the wrong decision remained unchanged, those who supported the decision increased by about 10 percent to more than one out of three. The number of students who listed a mixed "yes and no" response nearly doubled to about one out of seven. In addition, although nearly one out of every ten students wrote an unclear response, not a single student wrote "don't know" or left an answer blank.
In terms of the questionnaire results, students overwhelmingly responded that they liked the unit and found it interesting. The results, however, also indicated that most students continued to interpret the use of the bomb as an issue that affected the United States and Japan only, while some believed that it is possible to have an unbiased opinion.
The unit, nonetheless, gave the students an opportunity to "learn about the pros and cons" of President Truman's decision. They liked focusing on "one aspect of the war" and looking at "both sides." They learned to "understand the reasons why the atomic bomb was used," and they "got to voice [their] opinions upon what [their] great grandparents did." The few students who indicated that they did not like the unit did so because they either did not like studying the horror of war or simply did not like group work.
Many found the unit different because "they had never been able to decide for [themselves]" and it gave them "the chance to see a different side of the world and what they think about the United States." One student wrote that the class had learned not "just the unopinionated textbook side" but got to "use other sources and realize others' views." Others responded that it was "most interesting because of the depth," that they had to do "most of the work [themselves]," and that it helped them to "learn quicker and develop communication skills." The unit "makes you search for the important information yourself," wrote yet another.
Students liked learning about history from different perspectives, that "there are two sides to every situation," because in this way "you don't have a biased opinion." Although some felt that the unit "changed their minds and that they now felt completely different," others wrote that even though it "opened [their] eyes," it did not change their opinion. Echoing the research of Bohan and Davis (1998), some students wrote that "if you take a little bit from both, you can kinda figure out your own perspective" and "learn how [the use of the bomb] both hurt and helped."
In discussion about what they had personally learned from the unit, most students responded by listing facts. When asked, however, whether it was useful or meaningful to them, many made either explicit or implicit references to having learned how to empathize. Many felt they had learned how to avoid some of the "mistakes that Truman made" or how decisions "can [affect] the whole world." One student wrote that it made him "think of what [he] would do in the same place." A small group of students did not find the unit useful because "it wasn't going to help [them] get through life," but most found it meaningful because it made them "appreciate life more." They liked the unit because they were able to "be a judge on a piece of history" and because it helped them to "understand the legacy"[they were receiving. One student wrote that her view "has changed from completely disliking the decision to disliking but understanding it."
A few students still believed that "the truth" can be known, mostly by finding more information, but most of the students maintained that that is not possible. They remarked that "people rarely ever say what they are truly thinking" or that everybody "sees the world differently, especially history." Some even alleged that "governments [seek] to hide it." As reported in Foster and Yeager's study (1999), many students felt that unless a person had been a witness, the truth could not be known. Others, however, wrote that it is "human nature to interpret things the way we see or feel about them" and that "'the truth' is what people allow themselves to see and believe." Perhaps one student summarized it best when he simply wrote, "It's all a matter of perspective."
The findings of the study contribute to the teaching and learning of historical understanding in general and historical empathy in particular.
1. When guided by investigation questions, think aloud sessions in which students are able to share their own thinking freely significantly help them to analyze and understand the meaning of historical sources; the sessions encourage them to develop historical empathy. The questions gave the students a clear focus for their group discussions and helped them to keep each other on task when analyzing the documents. The questions made them focus on the actual content and consider the "facts" of the materials before them, rather than being swayed by emotions. Thus, the students were better able to understand why people acted they way they did.
- 2. Unless investigations are teacher-directed, students tend to interpret multiple sources from a dual, them-and-us perspective, as observed by Wineburg (1991a) and Bohan and Davis (1998). Having grown up in American culture, most students tend to view the world from that perspective. Perhaps because the United States is their homeland and also the first country to use the atomic bomb, the students tended to interpret its use from an American perspective. Even though most were able to develop some appreciation of a Japanese perspective, they were unable to see beyond the two countries that appeared to be most directly affected by the use of the bomb. Thus, despite inclusion of British and Russian perspectives in the documents and specific questions on the investigation sheet, almost no student was able to develop an empathy for either perspective.
- 3. Most groups were able to develop a written narrative in which they cited multiple sources and presented multiple perspectives, but they were unable to replicate that in their display. As the producers of the Smithsonian exhibit found out, it is difficult to develop and present a consensus on such a controversial issue as the use of the atomic bomb. The students also found it difficult to decide how to transfer their acquisition of multiple perspectives to a museum display. Most groups were simply unable to develop a group process to accomplish that goal.
- 4. By having students analyze multiple perspectives, teachers enable them to adduce better answers to why things happened the way they did. By being "judge of a piece of history," they are better able to learn and understand multiple perspectives and develop their own position. As history becomes more performance-based and interpretation-oriented, it becomes more relevant to their lives. Therefore, as students genuinely try to learn "the facts" about what happened, "make sense" out of what happened, understand why people did what they did, they develop their own perspective-taking ability and can decide what an event in the past means to them as young people living in today's world (Van Sledright 1995, 1996, 1997).
In this study, the students genuinely appreciated being able to develop their own positions on a topic. Focusing on a single event so extensively was a time consuming activity. The teacher preparation of the unit involved countless hours in the selection of materials and the development of learning activities. In addition, the teaching of the unit lasted almost three weeks. Van Sledright (1996) appropriately has suggested that there must be a proper balance between a focus on content and a focus on process. Nonetheless, this study illustrates the benefits of teaching historical thinking skills as an integral part of a history course.
As Seixas (1994, 1997) has written, students respond with commitment to learning when they perceive that what they are learning is relevant to their lives. If teachers learn how to help students reflect and see that history is "alive" and offers personal lessons for today, students will no longer be bored and will look forward to learning history.
From the results of this study, I concluded that students learn history better and in greater depth when the teacher acts as a facilitator and they have to "do history" themselves. Therefore, the traditional role of the teacher as the deliverer of knowledge must be reexamined and transformed into one in which he or she guides the students toward personal perspective taking.
Students do tend to focus narrowly on which side a document supports rather than how one particular document might include multiple perspectives. That narrow focus, in which every historical event has only two sides, is an issue that researchers and teachers need to address. One way for teachers to help students avoid a them-and-us perspective might be to analyze historical events that do not involve the United States.
Most students are capable, at least to some degree, of developing an understanding of multiple perspectives but have difficulty presenting different perspectives in a display format. It is important, however, that they acquire that skill because in the future they will have to be effective communicators. As citizens of an increasingly multicultural society, they will be expected to participate in team activities such as developing displays. Perhaps, at the beginning of a course, after a teacher-directed presentation of multiple perspectives on a particular historical issue, students could practice developing displays that present multiple perspectives. After having had that experience, students would complete future activities on their own with the teacher acting in a facilitating role.
Teaching and learning historical understanding through multiple perspectives is a productive and rewarding process in which students begin to realize that history is indeed an exciting subject. As they try to make more sense out of the past by "doing history" themselves, they develop a deeper sense of empathy for decisions made by previous generations. They come to realize that history always involves an interpretation of the past from multiple perspectives, with implications not only for present but also for the future.
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Beers, B. F. 1986. World history: Pattern of civilization. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
In mid-July 1945, the United States successfully tested an atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert. The atomic bomb was much more devastating than conventional weapons. Truman hesitated to use the new weapon, but conventional bombing had not been enough to force Japan to surrender. Also, Truman's military advisers warned that an American invasion of Japan might result in as many as 1 million American casualties. Truman decided to use the atomic bomb on Japan if necessary.
From mid-July to early August, Truman met with Stalin and Churchill at Potsdam, Germany. The three Allied leaders warned the Japanese, without being specific, that if they did not agree to unconditional surrender they would suffer "complete and utter destruction." The Japanese ignored this warning.
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The blast leveled 42 square miles of the city and killed at least 80,000 people immediately. Almost 40,000 others were seriously injured, and countless thousands were stricken with radiation sickness.
Despite the destruction at Hiroshima, Japan still refused to surrender. Three days later a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, killing 40,000. Japan could hold out no longer. On August 14, the Japanese surrendered, ending World War II (p. 622)
Farah, M., A. B. Karls, and C. M. Kortepeter. 1985. The human experience: A world history. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill
On July 26, 1945, the United States issued an ultimatum to Japan to surrender. When the Japanese refused, the United States decided to use a secret new weapon-the atomic bomb-to bring an end to the war. The bomb had the explosive force of 20,000 tons of TNT. Harry Truman, who had become president in April 1945 after the death of Roosevelt, received the news that the bomb had been tested successfully while he was at a conference in Potsdam, Germany. He and the other Allied leaders there were finalizing the plans they would put into effect after the war was over.
On August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a center of the Japanese munitions industry. The devastation was far greater than anyone had anticipated. Within moments of the blast, over 60 percent of Hiroshima was leveled. When the Japanese refused to surrender, the Americans dropped another bomb on the port city of Nagasaki. The destruction there was even greater than Hiroshima. In both cities, about 200,000 Japanese were killed.
Japan's emperor Hirohito issued a radio message saying that "the unendurable must be endured." On August 14, 1945, Japan agreed to surrender unconditionally. President Truman declared August 15, V-J (Victory over Japan) Day. On September 2, the surrender was made official in a formal ceremony aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The war was over. (pp. 654-55)
Wallbank, T. W., A. Schrier, D. Maier, and P. Gutierrez-Smith. 1993. History and life. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman
However, the United States wanted to avoid an invasion of Japan that would have meant the loss of hundreds of thousands of American troops. Instead, President Truman ordered that an atomic bomb be dropped on Japan. [. . . .]
On August 6, 1945, the destructive force of 20,000 tons of dynamite destroyed most of the Japanese city of Hiroshima. This single atomic bomb wounded or killed more than 160,000 persons.
On August 9 another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. On the same day, Soviet troops declared war on Japan and invaded Japanese-held areas of Korea and Manchuria. On August 10, the Japanese surrendered. The Soviet action did not affect Japan's decision to surrender, but it did have, as you will see, far-reaching implications in the years to come. (p. 652)
Ishizawa, K., and K. Iwamoto (producers). 1987. Hiroshima: The legacy [Videotape]. (Available from Films for the Humanities, Box 2053, Princeton, NJ 08540)
Survivor of the bombing of Hiroshima:
That day was simply a vision of hell. People like terrible spectres kept coming from the city center. They had both arms out and skin was hanging from them like this. At first I thought it was their clothing but it was skin. And their hair was all standing on end. You can see a woman with a black bundle. That was a baby burned black. She kept screaming: "Wake up! Say something!" But how could it?
Osborn, P. (producer), and T. Curran. 1995. Enola Gay and the atomic bombing of Japan [Videotape]. (Available from New Video Group, 126 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011)
Dwight Schultz, narrator, on General Leslie R. Groves's cable to Truman after the successful Trinity test on July 16, 1945:
Groves's good news is flashed by coded cable to Truman at Potsdam. The President tells Stalin of a new weapon of unusual destructive force. But the Soviet premier is nonchalant. Unbeknownst to Truman and Churchill, Klaus Fuchs has been keeping the Russians up to date all along.
Rafferty, K., J. Loader, and P. Rafferty (producers and directors). 1982. The atomic cafe [Videotape]. (Available from First Run Features, 153 Waverly Place, New York, NY 10014)
Colonel Paul Tibbets, first pilot of the Enola Gay, undated:
I have been subjected many times to criticism. I have been accused of being insane, being a drunkard, being everything that you can imagine a derelict to be as a result of a guilty conscience for doing this. And as I say, no one has ever come to my defense in that regard. I look at it this way, that my part in this thing may well have been something that later or now that the U.S. government might be looking at somewhat with a guilt complex, and the feeling could be that the less is said about it by the U.S. government the better.
Rafferty, K., J. Loader, and P. Rafferty (producers & directors). 1982. The atomic cafe [Videotape]. (Available from First Run Features, 153 Waverly Place, New York, NY 10014)
President Harry Truman, August 6, 1945, public speech after returning from Potsdam:
We have spent more than two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history and we have won. Having found the atomic bomb we have used it. We shall continue to use it until we completely destroy Japan's power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will stop us. It is an awful responsibility which has come to us. We thank God that it has come to us instead of to our enemies and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His purposes.
Alperovitz, G. 1965. Atomic diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. New York: Simon and Shuster
My own view is that presently available evidence shows that the atomic bomb was not needed to end the war or to save lives--and that this was understood by American leaders at the time. General Eisenhower has recently recalled that in mid-1945 he expressed a similar opinion to the Secretary of War: "I told him I was against it on two counts. First, the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing. Second, I hated to see our country to be the first to use such a weapon. . . ." (p. 14)
Ambrose, S. E. 1971. Rise to globalism: American foreign policy 1938-1970. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books
The Manhattan Project, the best-kept secret of the war, . . . to build and then use an atomic bomb, began in 1939, with the sole purpose of harnessing the energy of the atom to produce a bomb that could be carried by aircraft, and do it before the Germans succeeded in building one. J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the eminent scientists on the Project, later recalled, "We always assumed if they were needed they would be used." (p. 93)
Japan was fighting on only to avoid the humiliation of unconditional surrender. She wanted some explicit conditions to her capitulation, of which by far the most important was a guarantee that the Emperor would remain. As early as September 1944, the Japanese had approached the Swedish minister in Tokyo to see what terms they could get, but the attempt came to nothing. In April 1945, a new cabinet came to power with a mandate to end the war as soon as possible. The Japanese approached the Soviets, asking for mediation; the Russians, who were by then anxious to enter the war against Japan when their troops were ready, in order to have a voice in the post-war settlements in Asia, stalled. But thanks to their ability to read the enemy code, the Americans knew that Japanese were desperately trying to find a way out. (p. 96)
The simplest explanation is perhaps the most convincing. The bomb was there. No one in government seriously thought about not using it. To drop it as soon as it was ready seemed natural enough. As Truman later put it, "The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used." (p. 99)
Bernstein, B. J. 1995. The atomic bomb reconsidered. Foreign Affairs 74: 151-52.
A redefinition of morality was a product of World War II, which included such barbarities as Germany's systematic murder of six million Jews, and Japan's rape of Nanking. . . . By 1945 there were few moral restraints left in what had become virtually total war. . . . In that new moral climate, any nation that had the A-bomb would probably have used it against enemy peoples. British leaders as well as Joseph Stalin endorsed the act. Germany and Japan's leaders surely would have used it against cities. America was not morally unique--just technologically exceptional.
Churchill, W. 1954. The Second World War: Triumph and tragedy. Vol. 7. New York: Bantam Books
At any rate, there was never a moment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not. To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance. . . . Moreover, we should not need the Russians. . .. We had no need to ask favours of them. (p. 639)
Hersey, J. 1946. Hiroshima. New York: Alfred A. Knopf
Early that day, August 7th, the Japanese radio broadcast for the first time a succinct announcement that very few, if any, of the people most concerned with its content, the survivors in Hiroshima, happened to hear: "Hiroshima suffered considerable damage as a result of an attack by a few B-29s. It is believed that a new type of bomb was used. The details are being investigated." Nor is it probable that any survivors happened to be tuned in on a short-wave rebroadcast of an extraordinary announcement by the President of the United States, which identified the new bomb as atomic: "That bomb had more power than twenty thousand tons of TNT. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British Grand Slam, which is the largest bomb ever yet used in history of warfare." Those victims who were able to worry at all about what had happened thought of it and discussed it in more primitive, childish terms--gasoline sprinkled from an airplane, maybe, or some combustible gas, or a big cluster of incendiaries, or the work of parachutists; but, even if they had known the truth,most of them were too busy or too weary or too badly hurt to care that they were the objects of the first great experiment in the use of atomic power, which (as the voice on the short wave shouted) no country except the United States, with its industrial know-how, its willingness to throw two billion gold dollars into an important wartime gamble, could possibly have developed. (pp. 65-66)
Long, D. 1998. Hiroshima: Was It necessary? [Online]. Available:
On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on the people of Hiroshima. Early in the morning of August 9th Manchuria was invaded by the Soviet Union. The Soviets had notified Japan's Ambassador to Moscow on the night of the eighth that the Soviet Union would be at war with Japan as of August 9th. This was a blow to the Japanese government's peace-seeking efforts. The Russians had been the only major nation with which Japan still had a neutrality pact, and as such, had been Japan's main hope of negotiating a peace with something better than unconditional surrender terms. To that end, the Japanese government had been pursuing Soviet mediation to end the war in response to the Emperor's request of June 22, 1945, a fact often overlooked today.
Long, D. 1998. Hiroshima: Was It necessary? [Online]. Available:
But unconditional surrender would still leave the doves' central issue unanswered: would surrender allow Japan to retain the Emperor? Japan's Prime Minister Suzuki spelled out the problem of "unconditional surrender" well for doves and hawks alike when he publicly announced on June 9, 1945, "Should the emperor system be abolished, they [the Japanese people] would lose all reason for existence. 'Unconditional surrender', therefore means death to the hundred million: it leaves us no choice but to go on fighting to the last man.". . .
The U.S. government was not ignorant of the importance of the Emperor to Japanese surrender. Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew had explained this to President Truman in person on May 28, 1945. Grew had been U.S. Ambassador to Japan for 10 years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and was regarded as the most knowledgeable on Japan of any U.S. government official.
Osada, A. 1963. Children of the A-bomb: The testament of the boys and girls of Hiroshima. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons Sachiko Habu, 5th grade girl, 5 years old in 1945:
At that time I was only five so I don't remember all the things that happened very well. However, Grandfather has told me various things so I will write those together with the things I remember myself. Since that time six years have already passed and now I'm a big girl. Since my house was at Togiya close to the place where the bomb fell, my mother was turned into white bones before the family altar. (p. 11)
On the sixth of August this year it will be the seventh anniversary of Mother's death. At home Grandfather is telling everyone he will have a splendid service for her. It's already six years since Mother died. When I think that for all those years I haven't been able to talk to Mother, I feel so sad that I can hardly bear it. When I see the mothers of my classmates I suddenly feel so lonely that I want to cry. (p. 12)
Sauvain, P. 1993. The era of the Second World War. Cheltenham, England: Stanley Thornes
Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman, commenting in 1945:
It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon was of no material help in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and were ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful use of conventional bombing. The scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on this project. (p. 75)
Zhukov, G. K. 1971. The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. New York: Delacorte Press [Online]. Available:
I do not recall the exact date, but after the close of the formal meetings Truman informed Stalin that the United States now possessed a bomb of exceptional power, without, however, naming it the atomic bomb. As was later written abroad, at that moment Churchill fixed his gaze on Stalin's face, closely observing his reaction. However, Stalin did not betray his feelings and pretended he saw nothing special in what Truman had imparted to him. Both Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors subsequently assumed that Stalin had really failed to fathom the significance of what he had heard. . . .
In actual fact, on returning to his quarters after this meeting Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted almost immediately. "Let them. We'll have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up." . . .
I realized that they were talking about research on the atomic bomb. . . .
It was clear already that the US government intended to use the atomic bomb for the purpose of achieving its imperialist goals from a position of strength in "the cold war." This was amply corroborated on August 6 and 8. Without any military need whatsoever, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on the peaceful and densely-populated Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Zich, A. 1977. The rising sun. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books
In all, Japan maintained about 300 prisoner-of-war camps. . . . In Makassar, where a number of survivors of the Battle of the Java Sea were imprisoned, the men were routinely beaten with iron pipes, as many as 200 blows per beating, enough to reduce human flesh to pulp. On the deck of a ship bound for Shanghai, five American prisoners from Wake Island were decapitated without any explanations whatever. (p. 151)
A-bomb WWW Museum
Enola Gay and the Atomic Bomb
Enola Gay exhibit: Historians' letter to the Smithsonian
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum
Harry S. Truman Library and Museum
Hiroshima Archive
Hiroshima Live Project
Hiroshima: Was it necessary?
Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum
Remembering Nagasaki
The Atomic Archive
The Atomic Bomb: Decision
The Manhattan Project
Trinity Atomic Web Site
By Frans H. Doppen
Frans H. Doppen is an assistant professor at the P. K. Yonge Developmental Research School of the University of Florida-Gainesville, where he teaches world history.
